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RUEHZU/ASIAN PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION PRIORITY

RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL PRIORITY

RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 4597

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TOKYO 006057

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SUBJECT: JAPAN ENCOURAGES TOUGH STANCE ON DPRK WITH A/S HILL

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Classified By: Ambassador J.Thomas Schieffer. Reasons 1.4 (B) (D)

¶1. (C) Summary. On October 16, MOFA Asian and Oceanian Affairs Director General Sasae told visiting EAP Assistant Secretary Hill that the issue of maritime interdiction

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operations was generating what Sasae implied was excessive Japanese media attention. The Director General said the steps which Japan is considering under UNSCR 1718 would need to be closely coordinated with the U.S., and would need to be conducted in accordance with Japan's relevant maritime laws.

Sasae agreed that the U.S. and Japan should refuse to bargain with North Korea as a nuclear power state, and must refrain from making concessions based on old DPRK negotiating positions.

¶2. (C) A/S Hill replied that the U.S. did not intend to conduct an embargo.⁸ The Administration would delay offering additional sanctions in order to assess whether current measures were effective, he said. The Secretary would insist that the DPRK agree to three concrete steps before entering into any deal. In previewing her October 18-19 meetings in Tokyo, Hill stated that the Secretary would focus on broadening the U.S.-Japan alliance, implementing UNSCR 1718, strengthening the nonproliferation regime, and keeping open North Korea's return to the 6-Party Talks. End summary.

¶3. (C) On October 16, EAP A/S Christopher Hill met with MOFA Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau Director General Kenichiro Sasae to review common U.S.-Japan policies toward North Korea

in light of the DPRK's October 9 announcement that it had conducted a nuclear test. A/S Hill also previewed the Secretary's agenda for her October 18-19 Tokyo meetings with

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Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, Foreign Minister Taro Aso, and Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuhide Shiozaki. DCM, Pol M/C Meserve, and SA Gibbons accompanied Hill. The Japanese team included Deputy Director General for Asian Affairs Kunio Umeda, and NE Asia Director Shigeo Yamada.

Ship Inspections

¶4. (C) DG Sasae noted that the possibility of Japan's participating in cargo inspection/maritime interdiction operations was generating what he implied was excessive Japanese media attention. He explained that Japan's interdiction operations under UNSCR 1718 would need to be closely coordinated with the U.S. Japanese officials were debating how to proceed with inspections consistent with Japan's relevant maritime inspection laws. The Abe Administration was therefore eager to know what the U.S. planned to do, Sasae added. The DG asked what modalities the U.S. intended to use to carry out the inspections, whether Japan could expect to see U.S. Navy ships in the immediate future, and whether the U.S. intended to use the inspections to force the North Koreans back to the 6-party talks.

¶5. (C) A/S Hill replied that there was no intent to carry out &embargo8 operations) inspections would be carried out along the lines consistent with those of a PSI operation.

Future U.S. Sanctions

¶6. (C) Asked whether the U.S. intended to announce additional
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sanctions against the DPRK in the immediate future, A/S Hill noted that current U.S. thinking was to hold off on taking additional measures in order to assess whether the current actions were having a desirable effect. Considerable preparation had been made toward re-imposing measures lifted in 1994 and 2000, Hill said. The U.S. wanted to hold some actions in reserve for future use. In general, the A/S noted, Washington wanted to take time to assess how the current U.S. sanctions were impacting the DPRK.

¶7. (C) DG Sasae lamented that recent PRC statements expressing China's reluctance/refusal to carry out the cargo inspections specified by UNSCR 1718 undermined the united front that the U.S., Japan, and other UNSC members hoped to achieve. He and A/S Hill agreed that the Chinese were in a position to exert considerably more economic pressure on the DPRK than had so far been done.

U.S. Next Steps

¶8. (C) Sasae agreed that the U.S. and Japan should not bargain with North Korea as a nuclear power state. Nor should the two countries agree to make concessions based on DPRK attempts to re-offer old negotiating positions such as re-imposing a missile launch moratorium, he argued. The Japanese side pressed A/S Hill for next steps the U.S. might take if North Korea, even after sanctions had been imposed, still refused to return to the 6-party talks, tested another nuclear weapon, or otherwise continued to refuse to comply with the will of the international community. According to Hill, we would expect the North to agree to: 1) undertake a complete freeze on activities at Yongbyon, 2) authorize the return of IAEA inspectors to DPRK nuclear facilities, and 3)

dismantle at least some elements of Pyongyang's nuclear program in order to show seriousness of purpose.

Secretary with Abe/Aso

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¶9. (C) A/S Hill generally reviewed the Secretary's agenda for her October 18-19 Tokyo meetings with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and Foreign Minister Taro Aso:

- 1) Reassure Japan about the U.S. commitment to the alliance;
- 2) Discuss how to implement UNSCR 1718;
- 3) Seek ways to reinvigorate the nonproliferation regime and review the situation with Iran;
- 4) Discuss the status of the diplomatic tract.

Trilateral and Multilateral Discussions

¶10. (C) Sasae said he looked forward to re-starting trilateral discussions with the ROK in Seoul, but expressed doubt about the need to generate a joint statement following the talks, which the DG felt would likely be watered down by the South Korean side. Nevertheless, PM Abe had been pleased with his recent visit to Seoul, an event that offered some

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new opportunities for the trilateral process, the DG said. Sasae wondered if U.S. ideas about conducting a 5-party leaders, meeting at APEC might be too ambitious. A/S Hill noted that while the U.S. believed there was utility in organizing a 5-way leaders, gathering on North Korea, the Secretary might be open to the 5 5 format as an alternative.

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A/S Hill cleared this message.

SCHIEFFER